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Abstract
This paper incorporates social networks into a frictional labour market framework. There
are two worker types and two occupations. Both occupations are subject to correlated
business cycle fluctuations in labour demand. The equilibrium in this model is characterized
by occupational mismatch which is associated with a wage penalty. This paper shows that
there exists a unique value of network homophily maximizing the present value of income.
Therefore, there is a gain for risk-neutral workers if their network is diversified between
the two occupations. The reason for diversification is that the present value of income is
a non-linear function of the network composition. Thus, it is not the desire to reduce the
volatility of income as in standard portfolio theory which is driving the decision of workers.
Nevertheless, the optimal diversification level is higher with stronger negative correlation in
labour demand between the two occupations, with a lower unemployment benefit and with
a higher probability of recession in the primary occupation. On the other hand, the optimal
diversification level is reduced if there is on-the-job search in the state of mismatch.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the link between social networks and welfare in the context of a frictional
labour market with occupational mismatch. Empirical studies show that 30-60% of new hires
find jobs with a help of social contacts1. At the same time, there is evidence that up to 47% of
workers in some occupations are mismatched (Robst (2007)). Thus it is natural to ask whether
the network channel of job search contributes to the high levels of occupational mismatch. From
a theoretical perspective, Bentolila et al. (2010) and Horvath (2014b) show that social networks
with weak homophily may generate more mismatch compared to the formal channel of search.
Weak homophily here means that workers have relatively many social contacts in occupations
other than their own. However, more mismatch is not equivalent to lower welfare, especially in
the presence of occupation-specific fluctuations in labour demand. On the contrary, it may be
optimal for workers to diversify their networks across occupations in order to reduce the risk of
being unemployed even if this strategy is associated with more mismatch. This study fills the
gap in the analysis of network implications for social welfare and analyzes the optimal level of
network diversification in a setting with business-cycle fluctuations.
The ingredients of the model are as follows. There are two worker types and two occupations.
The type of worker is given by the initial training in one of the two occupations. Every worker
can be unemployed, employed in the primary occupation or mismatched, which is associated with
a wage penalty. Fluctuations in labour demand are described by a time-homogeneous transition
matrix and are correlated between the two occupations. In the benchmark case there are binary
vacancy fluctuations in each occupation, e.g. a period of expansion with many vacancies and
a period of recession with fewer vacancies. Every worker has a fixed total number of social
contacts, which is the network size. The level of network homophily is characterized by the
proportion of contacts to other workers of the same type. Thus a higher level of homophily
implies a less diversified network and vice versa.
In this setting the primary contribution of this paper is a full characterization of the optimal
network diversification level which maximizes the expected present value of income for a given
worker type. This diversification effect is new in the literature as workers in the model are risk-
neutral and their decisions are not driven by risk-aversion. Indeed, in the standard Markowitz
portfolio theory a risk-neutral investor will avoid diversification and invest into the stock with
the highest expected return. The main reason for this puzzling result is that expected income
is a non-linear function of network homophily. Thus the optimal level of network diversification
obtains at the point where the marginal gain from diversification is equal to the marginal cost.
The marginal gain from diversification is due to a higher probability of finding a mismatch job
especially in times of low labour demand in the primary occupation. The marginal cost is due
to a lower probability of finding a job in the primary occupation. More intuitively, since it is
always possible that the mismatch occupation is booming while the primary occupation of the
worker is experiencing a recession, it is optimal for workers to have a fraction of their contacts
in the mismatch occupation even though it is associated with a significant wage penalty.
This diversification result is robust to parameter changes in the comparative statics analysis.
1The incidence of referrals is 34 − 36% in France (Margolis and Simonnet (2003) and Delattre and Sabatier
(2007)), 47% in Italy and Portugal (Pistaferri (1999) and Addison and Portugal (2002)), 50− 56% in the United
States (Granovetter (1995) and Bentolila, Michelacci and Suarez (2010)).
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For example, I find that the optimal homophily level is higher and diversification is weaker if
labour demands in the two occupations are positively correlated. This is because with posi-
tive correlation it is less likely that the mismatch occupation is expanding while the primary
occupation is in a recession. Thus the gain from diversification is reduced. On the contrary,
the optimal homophily level is lower and diversification is stronger with a lower unemployment
benefit. Consider the situation when the primary occupation of the worker is experiencing a
recession and the person becomes unemployed. If unemployment insurance is relatively low, it
is optimal for the worker to have more contacts in the mismatch occupation in order to leave
the state of unemployment as soon as possible. In addition, diversification becomes less (more)
important with a higher (lower) frequency of expansions in the primary occupation.
Finally, in the last section of the paper the model is extended to allow for on-the-job search
in the state of mismatch. On the one hand, searching on-the-job is a valuable option for workers
which should raise the expected present value of income. But on the other hand, searching
mismatched workers reduce the job-finding chances of unemployed workers, which raises unem-
ployment and has a negative effect on the expected present value of income. I find that this
negative effect is dominating if social networks are relatively well diversified, which is intuitive
since workers are never mismatched with a fully homophilous network. Thus the optimal level
of homophily is higher and diversification is weaker with on-the-job search. Underlying this
result is the fact that primary contacts become more important if the worker wants to leave
a mismatch job and come back to the primary occupation. Thus the cost of diversification is
higher and the gain is lower with on-the-job search.
This paper is closely related to the literature on social networks in the labour market. The
first idea to introduce a separate homophily parameter into an economic model is due to Mont-
gomery (1991). This author and later Simon and Warner (1992) emphasize the point that friends
and acquaintances are likely to have similar skills and ability (homophily by skills). Thus re-
ferrals from high ability employees reveal positive information to the firm about the quality of
the match. This idea is empirically confirmed by Hensvik and Skans (2013) who show that in
Sweden entrants are more likely to be linked to high ability incumbent employees than to low
ability incumbents (defined from test scores or wages). Stupnytska and Zaharieva (2015) extend
this idea by separating family and professional contacts in their model. In the equilibrium there
is a self-selection of low ability workers into family referrals and high ability workers into pro-
fessional referrals, which generates a U-shape hiring pattern. Overall, transmitting information
about applicants’ characteristics to the employer is a first influence channel of social networks,
which is particularly important in a setting with heterogeneous workers.
Ioannides and Soetevent (2006) and Fontaine (2008) describe a second influence channel
which is based on the transmission of information about vacancies between connected workers.
In the former study better connected workers experience lower unemployment rates and receive
higher wages. Fontaine (2008) considers a frictional labour market and shows that differences
in networks can generate wage dispersion among equally productive workers. Other studies
incorporating networks into the search and matching framework include Kugler (2003), Cahuc
and Fontaine (2009), Zaharieva (2013) and Galenianos (2014). Kugler (2003) explains that
referees may exert peer pressure on newly hired workers, which makes it more profitable for
firms to pay efficiency wages. Zaharieva (2013) investigates network externalities and shows that
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bargained wages are inefficiently high because workers do not internalize the positive externality
on their network connections. Galenianos (2014) predicts and confirms empirically a positive
correlation between referral hiring and matching efficiency across industries. In all three studies
referrals are modeled as an additional channel of search, however, none of these models includes
the underlying structure of the network into the matching function. So Cahuc and Fontaine
(2009) is a first study incorporating an explicit structure of the network into the matching
function. Their network approach is also used in the present study but there is no mismatch
and diversification in their model.
To the best of my knowledge, there are only two studies combining social networks and on-
the-job search. Both Horvath (2014a) and Zaharieva (2015) consider a setting with heterogeneous
firms, hence employed workers accept job offers from more productive employers and forward
other offers from less productive employers to their network connections. This setup implies that
referral offers are associated with wage penalties. This feature is also present in the current study
as mismatch jobs pay low wages and there is an incentive for workers to continue searching on-
the-job in the hope of better payment in the primary occupation. Despite this similarity neither
Horvath (2014a) nor Zaharieva (2015) consider network diversification in the presence of business
cycle fluctuations which is the primary issue analyzed in this paper.
As mentioned in the beginning of this section there are only two studies combining networks
and occupational mismatch in a unified labour market framework. They are Bentolila et al.
(2010) and Horvath (2014b). Bentolila et al. (2010) report that social networks and referrals
can generate a mismatch between the occupational choice of the worker and his/her acquired
qualification. An implicit assumption for this result is that workers are never mismatched if they
find a job in a formal way. Horvath (2014b) extends this approach with a homophily parameter,
which is the extent of workers with similar educational background to be connected in the social
network. He finds that occupational mismatch is falling with a higher level of homophily in
the social network but leaves the issue of network diversification for future research. Finally,
Blazquez and Jansen (2008) also consider mismatch in a frictional labour market and show that
the equilibrium outcome with random search and ex-post bargaining is never efficient, but there
are no networks or referrals in their model.
Most other studies on occupational mismatch are empirical and distinguish between vertical
and horizontal mismatch. The former approach investigates whether workers are over- or under-
qualified for the job. In contrast, the horizontal mismatch approach doesn’t consider the level of
education but rather takes into account the type of education the worker obtained and the type
of skills required in the job. Horizontal mismatch appears in situations when the worker doesn’t
have the ”right” type of education to perform the job successfully, thus this approach is about
the degree of correspondence between the field of study and the occupation choice. This latter
idea is also used in the present work. A number of early empirical papers on horizontal mismatch
include Allen and van der Velden (2001), Wolbers (2003) and Robst (2007). For example, Wol-
bers (2003) considers data on school graduates in a number of Western European Economies and
finds that school-leavers from humanities, arts and agriculture are more likely to be mismatched
than those from engineering, manufacturing, business and law. He also considers the business
cycle perspective and reports that in times of high unemployment school-leavers more often have
to accept a job that does not fit their field of education. Another interesting finding of that
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paper is that for school-leavers with a job mismatch, the odds of looking for another job is 1.4
times larger than for the properly matched school-leavers. Robst (2007) finds similar results
for college graduates in the United States, where 27 − 47% of workers in arts, social sciences,
psychology, languages and biology are mismatched. He also reports that horizontal mismatch is
associated with a wage loss of about 10%.
More recent empirical studies on occupational mismatch include Allen and de Weert (2007),
Nordin et al. (2008), and Beduwe and Giret (2011). The first study finds that the proportion of
workers employed with an appropriate level of schooling but in a different field is 6% in Spain,
10% in Germany, 11% in the Netherlands and 18% in the UK. Moreover, this study confirms
that mismatched German and British respondents are significantly more likely to look for other
work. Nordin et al. (2008) finds that in Sweden 23% of men are strongly mismatched and 16%
are weakly mismatched in their job. In addition, they find a very large penalty associated with
occupational mismatch in Sweden equal to 32%. People with dentist, police and law education
are least often mismatched, whereas those with a biology, psychology or artistic education are
again more often mismatched. Finally, Beduwe and Giret (2011) investigate job characteris-
tics of workers who accomplished vocational training and find that 30% of them are vertically
matched but horizontally mismatched in France. They also find wage penalties of 2-3% for
mismatched workers. Overall, empirical evidence suggests that horizontal mismatch is a fre-
quent phenomenon. Moreover, mismatched workers are more likely to be involved in on-the-job
search. There is also a significant wage penalty associated with occupational mismatch which
varies across countries.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains notation and the general economic
environment. Section 3 presents the model with two occupations and correlated business-cycle
fluctuations. Section 4 illustrates the results by means of a large numerical example. Section 5
extends the model to account for on-the-job search. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Framework
Consider the model with two groups of infinitely lived risk neutral workers and two occupations.
Workers of type A obtained training in occupation A, which is their primary occupation, but
they can also work in occupation B, which is a mismatch occupation for them. In a similar way,
occupation B is a primary occupation for type B workers, whereas there is mismatch if type B
workers are employed in occupation A. Every worker can be either employed or unemployed.
Let uj denote the measure of unemployed workers of type j and ej – the measure of employed
type j workers, j = A,B. Each group of workers is a continuum of measure 1, thus uj + ej = 1.
Every employed worker may lose the job at rate δ. Unemployed workers of both types receive
the flow unemployment benefit z. Every occupation pays a flow wage w to workers trained in
this occupation and a lower wage w0 ∈ [z, w] to mismatched workers, such as type A workers in
occupation B and type B workers in occupation A. Workers discount future flows at rate r.
Every worker has n social contacts; γn of the same type and (1−γ)n contacts of the different
type. Variable γ ∈ [0.5..1] can be interpreted as a level of homophily in the society. Montgomery
(1991) refers to it as an ”inbreeding bias” by type. If γ = 1 the society is homophilous as only
workers of the same type are connected in networks. In contrast, if γ = 0.5 the two groups
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Figure 1: Left panel: n = 6, γ = 3/6. Right panel: n = 6, γ = 4/6.
are strongly mixed and there is no ”inbreeding bias”. In general, homophily refers to the fact
that people are more prone to maintain relationships with people who are similar to themselves.
There can be homophily measured by age, race, gender, religion or profession and it is generally
a robust observation in social networks (see McPherson et al. (2001) for an overview of research
on homophily). The focus of this paper is on the latter type of homophily by profession or
occupation. Jackson (2008) distinguishes between homophily due to opportunity and due to
choice. In this respect, homophily by occupation is likely to arise due to the fact that workers
with the same profession studied or worked together in the beginning of their career. Thus it is
rather a limited opportunity of meeting workers from different professions which can generate
homophily rather than an explicit choice.
Figures 1 and 2 provide an intuitive illustration of the model with N = 8 workers of type
A (pink nodes) and 8 workers of type B (green nodes). On the left panel of figure 1 there is
a regular network of degree n = 6, which means that all workers have an identical number of
links equal to 6. The homophily parameter of this network γ is 3/6 since every worker has
3 links with other workers of the same type and another 3 links with workers of the opposite
type2. Comparing both panels on figure 1 reveals that homophily is higher on the right panel:
γ = 4/6. It is then further increased on figure 2 reaching the levels γ = 5/6 and γ = 6/6.
This latter case corresponds to a fully homophilous network since there are no links between the
groups and the network falls apart into two independent components. In this setting, the main
research question addressed in this study is which of these network compositions corresponding
to different levels of γ will maximize the present value of expected income for workers? Is it a
network with γ = 0.5, γ = 1 or an intermediate value of γ?
In order to keep the model tractable I assume that there is only one channel of job search by
means of referrals. Thus hiring takes place if employed workers who get information about open
vacancies recommend their contacts for the job. To model this process I follow the approach of
Cahuc and Fontaine (2009). Firms with open vacancies in occupation A contact type A workers
2For every integer γn ∈ {1..N −1} such a network can be constructed in two steps. In the first step one should
construct two disconnected regular networks each of a given degree γn which is always possible if N is divisible
by 2. In the second step one should construct a regular bipartite network of degree (1− γ)n by matching workers
between the two groups.
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employed in their occupation at rate s per unit time. This is an exogenous search intensity of
employers. Every type A employee has γn type A contacts, where every contact is employed
with probability eA. Therefore, the probability that there is at least one unemployed contact of
type A who is willing to take the job is equal to 1− eγnA . Thus, the number of matches between
workers and vacancies of type A is equal to svA(1− e
γn
A ), where vA is a number of vacancies in
occupation A.
Figure 2: Left panel: n = 6, γ = 5/6. Right panel: n = 6, γ = 6/6.
However, if all type A contacts of the chosen employee are also employed, which happens
with probability eγnA , this employee may recommend a contact of type B. The probability that
there is at least one type B contact out of (1− γ)n is equal to 1− e
(1−γ)n
B . This is because type
B workers are employed with probability eB. Hence, the total number of matches between type
B workers and type A vacancies is equal to svAe
γn
A (1 − e
(1−γ)n
B ). With this information I can
find the job arrival rate to workers A getting jobs in occupation A, let it be denoted by λAA,
and the job arrival rate to workers B in occupation A, let it be denoted by λBA. Each of these
rates is equal to the ratio between the number of corresponding matches per unit time and the
number of searching unemployed workers of the corresponding type:
λAA =
svA
uA
(1− eγnA ) λBA =
svA
uB
· eγnA · (1− e
(1−γ)n
B )
In a similar way, one can find the job arrival rate to workers B getting jobs in occupation B,
denoted by λBB, and the job arrival rate to workers A in occupation B, denoted by λAB:
λBB =
svB
uB
· (1− eγnB ) λAB =
svB
uA
· eγnB · (1− e
(1−γ)n
A )
where vB is a number of vacancies in occupation B. Furthermore, at rate δ every job can be
destroyed for exogenous reasons. Labour market transitions are illustrated on figure 3, however,
job destruction flows are not included on this figure for the ease of illustration.
Note that the four job-finding rates above are presented for a given macroeconomic state
i, which is characterized by the exogenous vector of vacancies {viA, v
i
B}, i = 1, ..,m. Thus
formally all endogenous variables above should have an upper index i, that is {λiAA, λ
i
AB, λ
i
BB,
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uA vA
uB vB
λAA
λBB
λAB
λBA
Figure 3: Labour market transitions
λiBA, e
i
A, e
i
B, u
i
A, u
i
B}. However, the upper index was suppressed for the ease of notation. At
Poisson rate φ the macroeconomic state of the economy may change according to the time-
homogeneous discrete Markov chain with a transition matrix Π:
Π =


pi1 · · · pim
... · · ·
...
pi1 · · · pim

 where m∑
i=1
pii = 1
Intuitively, this means that φpii is a constant arrival rate of state i with a vector of vacancies
{viA, v
i
B}, i = 1, ..,m. Variable φ measures the frequency of business cycle fluctuations in labour
demand. For example, consider state i and a short period of time ∆t. With probability e−φ∆t no
shock will arrive during this period of time. For a small ∆t this probability can be approximated
as 1−φ∆t. So the probability that state i will remain unchanged by the end of the period is given
by 1− φ∆t+ φ∆tpii = 1− (1− pi)φ∆t. The first term in this expression is the probability that
no shock will arrive, and the second term is the probability that state i will persist conditional
on the shock. In addition, with probability φ∆tpij the new state after the shock will be state j,
j 6= i. Hence a higher value of φ implies more frequent fluctuations, while a lower value of φ is
associated with higher persistence of economic states.
3 The Model
3.1 Unemployment rates
This section is dedicated to the analysis of unemployment rates uA and uB, where the upper
index i is again suppressed. Specifically, I follow the approach by Hall and Milgrom (2008).
Although in principle both unemployment rates are separate state variables, they move so much
faster than i that one can use the equilibrium values as close approximations of the actual values
of unemployment rates. Thus in every state i, the inflow of workers into unemployment should
be equal to the outflow of workers. On the one hand, at rate δ every worker loses the job, thus,
the inflow of type A workers is equal to δ(1−uA). On the other hand, every unemployed type A
worker finds some job at rate λAA+λAB, either in the primary occupation or in the mismatched
occupation. So the differential equation for the unemployment rate of type A workers becomes:
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u˙A = δ(1− uA) − uA(λAA + λAB). And the differential equation for the unemployment rate of
type B workers is: u˙B = δ(1 − uB) − uB(λBB + λBA). In the equilibrium it holds that u˙A = 0
and u˙B = 0, so that:
uA =
δ
δ + λAA + λAB
uB =
δ
δ + λBA + λBB
(3.1)
Inserting values for λAA, λAB, λBB and λBA into (1) produces a system of two equations in
two employment variables eA and eB. This is summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 1: For every state i, i = 1, ..,m, the equilibrium employment rates eA and eB are
uniquely determined from the following system of equations:
svA(1− e
γn
A ) + svB · e
γn
B · (1− e
(1−γ)n
A ) = δeA ⇒ eA(eB) (3.2)
svA · e
γn
A · (1− e
(1−γ)n
B ) + svB · (1− e
γn
B ) = δeB ⇒ eB(eA) (3.3)
A higher number of vacancies vA leads to higher employment in both occupations eA and eB and
higher job-finding rates λAA, λAB, λBB and λBA. The same is true for a higher vB.
Proof: Appendix I.
eA(eB)
eA(eB)
eB(eA)eB(eA)
eBeB
eAeA
Figure 4: Left panel: equilibrium. Right panel: positive shock in vA
Consider equation (2). The right-hand side of this equation is a linear function increasing
from 0 to δ when eA is increasing from 0 to 1. On the contrary, the left-hand side of this
equation is decreasing down to zero when eA = 1. So there exists a unique intersection between
these curves. A larger value eB raises the left-hand side of equation (2), thereby increasing eA.
Thus, one can write eA as an increasing function of eB, where eA(0) > 0 and eA(1) < 1. This
relation highlights spillovers between the two occupations. If a larger fraction of type B workers
is employed (i.e. eB is rising), then more type B workers will be recommending their type A
social contacts for jobs in occupation B. So the equilibrium employment rate of type A workers
is higher. The same holds true for a higher employment rate eA, which has a positive effect
on the employment rate of type B workers. This follows from equation (3), where eB(0) > 0
and eB(1) < 1. Hence the equilibrium values of eA and eB can be obtained at the intersection
9
between the two positively sloping curves eA(eB) and eB(eA) which is illustrated on the left
panel of figure 4.
Next consider a positive change in vacancies vA which is illustrated on the right panel of
figure 4. First, there is a direct positive effect on the employment of type A workers as finding
jobs in occupation A becomes easier. Graphically this corresponds to the upward shift in eA(eB).
Second, a higher employment of type A workers brings more type B workers into jobs, so there is
a downward rotation in the curve eB(eA). Combining these two shifts together one can see that
due to networks a higher number of vacancies in one occupation is propagating employment in the
other occupation. However, this network multiplier is not necessarily a desirable feature for the
labour market as it will unambiguously amplify the rise of unemployment in the economy-wide
recession. As a final remark in this subsection, notice that the corner case γ = 1, corresponding
to full homophily, implies that eA(eB) is a horizontal curve independent of eB and eB(eA) is
a vertical curve independent of eA. In this case, unemployment shifts in response to vacancy
fluctuations are not amplified as the two types of workers are not connected.
3.2 Numerical example
This subsection illustrates the theoretical result from lemma 1 by means of a numerical example.
Consider the case of binary labour demand in each of the two occupations. This is the model
with m = 4 states (see table 1), where every occupation can be either expanding or shrinking.
In addition, this example allows me to estimate the fractions of mismatched type A and type B
workers, let them be denoted by eAB and eBA respectively.
Expansion in B, vB = 0.05 Recession in B, vB = 0.04
State 1 with prob. pi1 State 2 with prob. pi2
Expansion in A eA = eB = 0.934 eA = 0.907, eB = 0.875
vA = 0.05 eAB = eBA = 0.191 eAB = 0.048, eBA = 0.131
λAA = λBB = 1.130 λAA = 0.921, λBB = 0.597
λAB = λBA = 0.290 λAB = 0.050, λBA = 0.105
State 3 with prob. pi3 State 4 with prob. pi4
Recession in A eA = 0.875, eB = 0.907 eA = eB = 0.800
vA = 0.04 eAB = 0.131, eBA = 0.048 eAB = eBA = 0.009
λAA = 0.597, λBB = 0.921 λAA = λBB = 0.395
λAB = 0.105, λBA = 0.050 λAB = λBA = 0.005
Table 1: The model with m = 4 states, δ = 0.1, s = 2, n = 40, γ = 0.5
Consider an economy in state 4 which is an economy-wide recession (vA = 0.04, vB = 0.04).
At rate φpi2 occupation A starts recovering which is reflected by the sharp rise of vacancies vA
from 0.04 to 0.05. In accordance with lemma 1 this is associated with a rise of employment of
type A workers eA from 0.800 to 0.907. In addition, there is a positive spillover effect on type
B workers whose job-finding rate in the mismatch occupation λBA is increasing from 0.005 to
0.105 and their employment rate eB is increasing from 0.800 to 0.875. At rate φpi1 occupation
B starts recovering and the economy is moving from state 2 to state 1. This is associated with a
moderate rise of employment eB from 0.875 to 0.934 followed by a small increase of employment
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eA from 0.907 to 0.934 due to the network spillover.
Finally, note that 19.1% of workers are mismatched if both occupations are expanding. This
is due to the fact that vacancy stocks are relatively high in both occupations and workers prefer
to be mismatched rather than unemployed. In contrast, the mismatch level is only 0.9% if there
is an economy-wide recession in state 4.
3.3 Present value equations
Next consider present value equations for workers of type A. Let U iA denote the present value
of unemployed type A workers in state i. The objective of this section is to express variable U iA
as a function of model parameters. Moen (1997) proved that maximizing the present value of
unemployment is equivalent to the maximization of welfare for a given risk-neutral worker type.
This is because the present value of unemployment is a forward-looking variable, which takes
into account the probability of finding a job and the expected wage. Thus it is U iA which will be
maximized with respect to γ in the next sections of the paper. In addition, let variables W iAA
and W iAB denote the present values of type A employees in occupations A and B respectively.
The present value U iA can then be written as:
rU iA = z + λ
i
AA(W
i
AA − U
i
A) + λ
i
AB(W
i
AB − U
i
A) +
+ φ[pi1(U
1
A − U
i
A) + ...+ pii−1(U
i−1
A − U
i
A) + pii+1(U
i+1
A − U
i
A) + ...+ pim(U
m
A − U
i
A)]
Unemployed workers receive the flow unemployment benefit z and may find a job in their primary
occupation which happens at rate λiAA or in the mismatch occupation which happens at rate λ
i
AB.
Alternatively, the macroeconomic state may change at rate φ, where the new state is determined
according to the probability distribution {pi1, .., pim}. The present values of employment W
i
AA
and W iAB can be written as:
rW iAA = w − δ(W
i
AA − U
i
A) + φ[pi1(W
1
AA −W
i
AA) + ...+ pii−1(W
i−1
AA −W
i
AA) +
+ pii+1(W
i+1
AA −W
i
AA) + ...+ pim(W
m
AA −W
i
AA)]
rW iAB = w0 − δ(W
i
AB − U
i
A) + φ[pi1(W
1
AB −W
i
AB) + ...+ pii−1(W
i−1
AB −W
i
AB) +
+ pii+1(W
i+1
AB −W
i
AB) + ...+ pim(W
m
AB −W
i
AB)]
These equations reflect the fact that workers get a high wage w if employed in their primary
occupation and a low wage w0 if mismatched. The three equations above form a system of
3m equations for type A workers. In addition, there are 3m similar equations for type B
workers, so the total number of equations is 6m. In order to solve this system I am going to use
matrix notation. Let UA denote a column-vector containing values U
i
A for every state i. When
unemployed, all workers receive the unemployment benefit z, so let ζ denote a column-vector of
z-values, which has dimension m× 1. Moreover, type A workers can find a job in occupation A,
which corresponds to the matrix of job-finding rates ΛAA of dimension m×m, and a mismatch
job in occupation B, which corresponds to the matrix of job-finding rates ΛAB. This notation
allows me to rewrite the present value equations in matrix form:
rUA = ζ + ΛAA(WAA − UA) + ΛAB(WAB − UA) + φ(Π− I)UA
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rWAA = ω − δ(WAA − UA) + φ(Π− I)WAA
rWAB = ω0 − δ(WAB − UA) + φ(Π− I)WAB
UA =


U1A
...
UmA

 WAj =


W 1Aj
...
WmAj

 ΛAj =


λ1Aj · · · 0
...
...
...
0 · · · λmAj

 j = A,B
where r, δ, φ are scalars, I is the identity matrix and ω, ω0 are the (m × 1) vectors of wages w
and w0 respectively. Note that at rate φ the macroeconomic state of the economy may change
according to the transition matrix Π. With this matrix notation, present values of employed
type A workers, i.e. WAA and WAB, can be expressed as:
WAA =M(ω + δUA) WAB =M(ω0 + δUA) where M = [(r + δ + φ)I − φΠ]
−1
M is the auxiliary matrix. Inserting these expressions into the equation for UA and repeating
the same procedure for workers of type B, I obtain the following results:
UA = [(r + φ)I − φΠ+ (ΛAA + ΛAB)(I − δM)]
−1(z + ΛAAMw + ΛABMw0)
UB = [(r + φ)I − φΠ+ (ΛBA + ΛBB)(I − δM)]
−1(z + ΛBBMw + ΛBAMw0)
Note that the job-finding matrices ΛAj and ΛBj , j = A,B depend on the homophily parameter
γ, thus the present value of searching workers also depends on γ which allows me to investigate
the question whether full homophily γ = 1 will maximize the present value of income, or it
will be maximized for some interior value of γ, implying a diversified (heterophilous) network.
Next, define GA = [(r + φ)I − φΠ + (ΛAA + ΛAB)(I − δM)]
−1 and GB = [(r + φ)I − φΠ +
(ΛBA+ΛBB)(I− δM)]
−1 as additional auxiliary matrices. Interestingly, these matrices strongly
depend on different transition rates but they don’t depend on the monetary variables z, w and
w0. This allows me to recover the individual elements of UA and UB switching back from the
matrix notation to scalars. These results are summarized in proposition 1:
Proposition 1:Let gAil denote the elements of matrix GA and mlk denote the elements of
matrix M . The present value of income for unemployed type A workers U iA is given by a linear
combination of the unemployment benefit and wages:
U iA = z
m∑
l=1
gAil + w
m∑
l=1
gAilλ
l
AA
m∑
k=1
mlk + w0
m∑
l=1
gAilλ
l
AB
m∑
k=1
mlk
Proof: Appendix II.
This proposition shows that the present value of income U iA is linearly increasing in each
of the three monetary variables z, w and w0, but it is a non-linear function of the homophily
parameter γ through the job-finding rates λiAj .
One last question which should be clarified in this section, is that of reservation wages. The
equilibrium solution derived in proposition 1 is based on the assumption that workers accept
mismatch jobs in every state of the economy. Thus it should be checked that this condition
is satisfied in the equilibrium. To address this issue let wR0 be the reservation wage of type
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A workers in the best macroeconomic state, i.e. when vacancy rates are at their maximum in
both occupations. Without loss of generality, let this be state 1. Intuitively, if w0 > w
R
0 , then
unemployed workers would accept mismatch jobs in all states of the economy, even in state 1,
which is defined as an economy-wide expansion. The reservation wage wR0 is defined as a wage
level which makes type ”A” workers indifferent between accepting and rejecting the mismatch
job: U1A =W
1
AB. In Lemma 2 this reservation wage is derived as a function of model parameters:
Lemma 2: Let state 1 be an economy-wide expansion. The reservation wage of type A
workers in this state is given by:
wR0 =
z
m∑
l=1
gA1l + w
m∑
l=1
gA1lλ
l
AA
m∑
k=1
mlk − δz
m∑
i=1
m1i
m∑
l=1
gAil − δw
m∑
i=1
m1i
m∑
l=1
gAilλ
l
AA
m∑
k=1
mlk
m∑
i=1
m1i + δ
m∑
i=1
m1i
m∑
l=1
gAilλ
l
AB
m∑
k=1
mlk −
m∑
l=1
gA1lλ
l
AB
m∑
k=1
mlk
Proof: Appendix II.
The reservation wage of type B workers can be derived analogously. Note that the above
solution is obtained for the equilibrium values of all transition rates λlAj in state 1. This corre-
sponds to the idea that deviating from the equilibrium strategy and rejecting a mismatch job
should not be profitable for a single worker. However, if one worker decides to deviate it will
not change the labour market conditions such as the job-finding rates λlAj . This implies that
the reservation wage should be estimated at the equilibrium transitions rates, which gives rise
to the solution in lemma 2. The next subsection is dealing with a case of binary fluctuation in
labour demand allowing for a more intuitive reduced representation of the model and its results.
3.4 Binary labour demand fluctuations
This section is dealing with an intuitive case of binary labour demand in each of the two oc-
cupations. This is the model with m = 4 states already used in the numerical example above.
In this economy every occupation can be either expanding or hit by recession. Let p denote
the probability that occupation A is in the state of expansion, thus 1 − p is the probability of
recession in occupation A. Similarly, let q be the probability that occupation B is expanding. In
addition, let ρ be the correlation coefficient between the two occupations. With this notation,
the matrix of transition probabilities Π can be expressed as follows:
Expansion in B, q Recession in B, 1− q
Expansion
in A, p pi1 = pq + ρ
√
p(1− p)q(1− q) pi2 = p(1− q)− ρ
√
p(1− p)q(1− q)
Recession pi3 = (1− p)q − ρ
√
p(1− p)q(1− q) pi4 = (1− p)(1− q) + ρ
√
p(1− p)q(1− q)
in A, 1− p
Table 2: Parameterization of the transition matrix Π
The derivation of this matrix is presented in appendix III. Note that ρ = 0 corresponds to
the case of independent fluctuations in labour demand between the occupations. However, a
positive value of the correlation coefficient leads to more probability mass on the diagonal, thus
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symmetric states with two expansions or two recessions become more likely. In contrast, when
ρ is negative asymmetric states become more likely. In the following consider two special cases
associated with table 2.
Special case 1: Symmetric occupations (p = q = 0.5):
If the two occupations are symmetric, i.e. p = q = 0.5, the four transition probabilities are:
pi1 = pi4 = 0.25(1 + ρ) pi2 = pi3 = 0.25(1− ρ)
This case is convenient for analyzing comparative statics results with respect to ρ.
Special case 2: Perfect negative correlation ρ = −1:
Note that this case automatically implies that p = 1 − q, thus the model is reduced from
4 to only 2 states (m = 2): state 2 – expansion in occupation A, recession in occupation B,
and state 3 – recession in occupation A, expansion in occupation B. The matrix of transition
probabilities Π is then simplified in the following way:
Π =
(
1− q q
1− q q
)
This case is convenient for analyzing comparative statics results with respect to q. Considering
the model with perfectly negatively correlated fluctuations allows me to find an explicit equa-
tion for the income present value of unemployed workers as a scalar function of the homophily
parameter γ. Further, diversification will be more important if the primary occupation of the
worker has low labour demand, which is state 3 for type A workers and state 2 for type B
workers. Thus proposition 2 presents solution for the present values U3A and U
2
B. The other two
values U2A and U
3
B can be found in appendix IV.
Proposition 2: In the case of binary fluctuations in labour demand and perfect negative
correlation between the occupations (ρ = −1), the present value of unemployment is a weighted
average between wages w, w0 and the unemployment benefit z:
rU3A(γ) = z(1− f
3
AA(γ)− f
3
AB(γ)) + wf
3
AA(γ) + w0f
3
AB(γ)
rU2B(γ) = z(1− f
2
BB(γ)− f
2
BA(γ)) + wf
2
BB(γ) + w0f
2
BA(γ)
where the weights f3AA, f
3
AB, f
2
BA, f
2
BB ∈ [0..1] are given by:
f3Aj =
cλ2Aj + dλ
3
Aj
(r + δ)(c+ d) + cλ2AA + dλ
3
AA + cλ
2
AB + dλ
3
AB
j = A,B
f2Bj =
a′λ2Bj + b
′λ3Bj
(r + δ)(a′ + b′) + a′λ2BB + b
′λ3BB + a
′λ2BA + b
′λ3BA
j = A,B
and variables c, d, a′, b′ are provided in the appendix.
Proof: Appendix IV.
If the two sectors are symmetric (i.e. p = q = 0.5), then it holds that λ3AA = λ
2
BB, λ
2
AA =
λ3BB, λ
2
BA = λ
3
AB and λ
2
AB = λ
3
BA. This means a
′ = d, b′ = c, so that f3AA = f
2
BB and
f3AB = f
2
BA. This however means that type A workers obtain the same present value of income
in state 3 (when sector A has low labour demand) as type B workers in state 2 (when sector
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B has low labour demand): U3A(γ) = U
2
B(γ). Otherwise, for any q 6= 0.5 the two present values
are different. Next, consider the situation from the perspective of type A workers. Based on
proposition 2 one can find the optimal level of diversification which would maximize their present
value U3A(γ). Let it be denoted by γ
∗. It can be found from the following first order condition:
−
∂f3AA(γ
∗)
∂γ
(w − z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal cost of diversification
=
∂f3AB(γ
∗)
∂γ
(w0 − z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal gain of diversification
where ∂f3AA/∂γ > 0 and ∂fAB/∂γ < 0. Consider diversifying the network by reducing γ. The
left-hand side of this condition is the marginal cost of diversification, which is reflected in worse
employment chances in the primary occupation for type A workers if gamma is lower. The
right-hand side of this equation is the marginal gain, as lower γ implies a higher number of
type B contacts and better employment chances in occupation B. Is it always the case that the
marginal cost is larger than the marginal gain? Let the number of contacts n be sufficiently large
and γ = 1, then reducing the number of contacts of the same type down to n−1 is likely to have
a small impact on the probability of finding a job in the primary occupation λiAA and a large
impact on the probability of finding a job in the mismatch occupation λiAB. This means, in the
case of full homophily, one can expect a large gain and a small cost of network diversification.
Continuing this way, one arrives at the point where the marginal gain is exactly equal to the
marginal cost, which is precisely the optimal level of network diversification γ∗.
Finally, note that the marginal gain of diversification strongly depends on the difference
w0 − z. When accepting mismatched jobs in occupation B type A workers increase their flow
income from z to w0 but give up the option of finding a job in their primary occupation. This
means that diversification of social contacts is never optimal if w0 = z. In this situation there
are no gains from diversification. Thus diversification is more likely with a higher value of w0
and a lower value of z.
4 Comparative statics analysis
Figure 5 illustrates the shape of the unemployment present value U3A for different values of the
correlation coefficient ρ. The two expansion probabilities are fixed at p = q = 0.5, moreover, if
the two occupations have identical parameters it is true that U3A = U
2
B. This means that both
worker types obtain a maximum present value at the same diversification level γ∗. The case of
asymmetric occupations will be investigated later in this section. The left panel of this figure
shows the main result of this paper. The present value of income is maximized for some interior
homophily level. For example, if the two occupations are perfectly negatively correlated. i.e.
ρ = −1, workers will achieve a maximum present value when γ∗ = 0.625, which is the proportion
of contacts in their primary occupation (A) (see the pink solid curve). This corresponds to 25
contacts out of n = 40. At the same time, it is optimal for them to have (1−γ)n = 15 contacts in
the mismatch occupation in order to exit unemployment as soon as possible if there is low labour
demand in the primary occupation. Note that the optimal γ∗ is increasing with higher values
of the correlation coefficient. For example, when the two occupations are perfectly positively
correlated, i.e. ρ = 1, the optimal level of homophily is equal to 0.675, which means 27 contacts
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in the primary occupation and 13 contacts in the mismatch occupation (see the green solid
curve).
Figure 5: Left panel: PV of unemployment U3A. Right panel: Unemployment rates u
3
A, u
3
B.
Common parameters: δ = 0.1, s = 2, n = 40, z = 0.2, w0 = 0.85, w = 0.9, p = q = 0.5.
The right panel of figure 5 illustrates unemployment rates u3A and u
3
B for different levels of
homophily. If both occupations are expanding (i.e. v1A = v
1
B = 0.05), then the two unemployment
rates are the same and equal to 0.066 for any value of γ. The same is true when both occupations
are in a recession (i.e. v4A = v
4
B = 0.04), so that the two unemployment rates are equal to 0.2 for
any value of γ. In contrast, the level of homophily has a strong impact on the unemployment
rates if the two occupations are in the opposite states. As follows from figure 5, increasing
homophily from γ = 0.5 to 1 is associated with a drop in unemployment from 0.093 to 0.066
for workers trained in the expanding occupation (see the pink solid curve on the right panel).
Moreover, the same increase in the level of homophily is associated with a dramatic rise of
unemployment from 0.125 to 0.2 for workers trained in the recessing occupation (see the green
solid curve on the right panel). This is intuitive, since having all contacts in the recessing
occupation implies a very low job-finding rate, so many workers remain unemployed.
To understand the role of wages and unemployment benefits for network diversification,
consider the case of perfect negative correlation (ρ = −1). As follows from the theoretical part
of the paper, diversification is more desirable if the unemployment benefit z is relatively low
whereas the mismatch wage w0 is relatively high. This is illustrated on the left panel of figure
6. This figure shows that γ∗ = 0.6 is optimal if the unemployment benefit is reduced down to
z = 0.1, whereas γ∗ = 0.65 if the unemployment benefit is increased to z = 0.3.
The right panel of figure 6 shows comparative statics with respect to the probability of
expansion in occupation B which is captured by variable q. Note that this probability is the
same as the probability of recession in occupation A, since q = 1−p in the case of perfect negative
correlation. The present value of unemployment is very sensitive to this parameter. For example,
γ∗ = 0.5 (corner solution) if occupation A is almost always in a recession, which happens for
q = 0.99 and p = 0.01. This means that workers trained in a constantly recessing occupation
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Figure 6: Both panels show the present value of unemployment U3A. Common parameters:
δ = 0.1, s = 2, n = 40, ρ = −1, w0 = 0.85, w = 0.9.
will gain most from full diversification. However, as q is decreasing and p is increasing, the
optimal level of homophily is going up, reaching the level γ∗ = 0.925 for q = 0.01 and p = 0.99.
This corresponds to having 37 contacts in the primary occupation and only 3 contacts in the
mismatch occupation. Indeed, there are no reasons to have many contacts in the mismatch
occupation if your own occupation is constantly expanding.
In addition, the right panel of figure 6 shows that there doesn’t exist a unique value of the
diversification parameter γ maximizing the income present value of both worker types simulta-
neously if the two occupations are not symmetric. Recall that the optimal number of contacts
was equal to 0.625 when ρ = −1 and p = q = 0.5. If the probability of expansion is relatively
low in occupation A and relatively high in occupation B (case p = 0.25 and q = 0.75), then
it is optimal for type A workers to have a fully diversified network (see the green curve on the
right panel of figure 6). In contrast, for type B workers the maximum is reached if they have a
fraction γ∗ = 0.8 of their contacts in occupation B (see the pink curve on the same figure). So
the optimal composition of the network differs between the two types of workers.
Figure 7 shows that this asymmetric network composition is not an artifact of the perfect
negative correlation. For example, the left panel of figure 7 presents results for the case of
independent occupations, i.e. ρ = 0. Here again the optimal number of contacts for type A
workers is falling from 0.65 to 0.5 (see the shift from the black curve to the green curve) when
the probability of expansion in occupation A is decreasing from p = 0.5 (and q = 0.5) to p = 0.25
(and q = 0.75). On the contrary, the optimal number of contacts for type B workers is increasing
to γ∗ = 0.85 in this case (see the shift from the black curve to the pink curve).
The right panel of figure 7 shows the reservation wage wR0 for different levels of γ and ρ.
First, note that for all parameter values on the figure it holds that w0 = 0.85 > w
R
0 , which means
that all workers accept jobs in the mismatch occupation even in the case of an economy-wide
expansion. This guarantees existence of the equilibrium described above. In addition, one can
see that the reservation wage is increasing as the correlation coefficient becomes more negative.
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This is in line with the previous findings as negative correlation between occupations is beneficial
for workers and is associated with a higher present value of unemployment. Negative correlation
implies a lower probability of an economy-wide recession, so that unemployed workers face better
chances of finding a job in the nearest future which makes them choosier with respect to accepted
wages. Considering again the case of perfect negative correlation, and different values of q, it
is not surprising that lower values of q (which means higher levels of p) improve the present
value of unemployment for type A workers. However, I find that the reservation wage is not
very sensitive to this parameter rising up to 0.845 if q = 0.01 (p = 0.99). This means even in a
good scenario with perfect negative correlation and frequent expansions in occupation A, type
A workers continue accepting mismatch jobs with a flow wage w0 = 0.85. The same is true for
type B workers.
Figure 7: Left panel: the present value of unemployment U3A for ρ = 0. Right panel: the
reservation wage wR0 for q = p = 0.5. Common parameters: δ = 0.1, s = 2, n = 40, z = 0.2,
w0 = 0.85, w = 0.9.
Overall, figure 7 shows that the reservation wage wR0 is relatively high reaching the level of
0.84 for some values of γ and ρ. This is because the model presented above does not account
for the possibility of searching on-the-job. Nevertheless, empirical evidence (e.g. Wolbers (2003)
and Beduwe and Giret (2011)) shows that mismatched workers are searching more intensively
for alternative jobs compared to those employed in their primary occupation. These findings
are taken into account in the next section where the model is extended to the case of on-the-
job search by mismatched workers. At the same time, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) show
that reservation wages are typically lower with on-the-job search. When accepting mismatch
employment in a situation without on-the-job search workers give up a valuable option to get a
job in the primary occupation. So they require a high compensation for the loss of this option.
In a similar situation with on-the-job search workers do not fully lose the possibility of getting a
job in the primary occupation, so their required compensation is reduced. For the next section
this implies that the level of reservation wages is less important for equilibrium existence and
will not be considered.
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5 On-the-job search
5.1 Job arrival rates
This section extends the model to the case of on-the-job search. It is intuitive to think that
mismatched workers may continue searching for jobs in their primary occupation. Let ηA denote
the job arrival rate to workers A employed in the mismatch occupation B and associated with
on-the-job search. In a similar way, ηB denotes the job arrival rate to workers B associated with
on-the-job search (see figure 8). Recall that eAA is the mass of type A workers employed in their
primary occupation and eAB – the mass of mismatched type A workers, so that eA = eAA+eAB.
I use similar notation for type B workers, so that eB = eBB + eBA. As before firms with open
vacancies in occupation A contact one of the incumbent employees of type A employed in their
occupation at rate s per unit time. The incumbent employee who is chosen to recommend a
friend out of his/her network of n contacts acts according to the following scheme:
• If there is at least one unemployed type A contact, forward the offer to this person.
Randomize if there are several unemployed type A contacts;
• If there are no unemployed type A contacts, check if there is at least one mismatched type
A contact and forward the offer to this person. Randomize if there are several mismatched
type A contacts;
• If none of type A contacts is either unemployed or mismatched, check if there is at least
one unemployed type B contact and forward the offer to this person. Randomize if there
are several unemployed type B contacts;
• If none of type A contacts is either unemployed or mismatched and none of type B contacts
is unemployed the offer is lost.
uA vA
uB vB
λAA
λBB
λAB
λBA
ηB ηA
Figure 8: Labour market transitions with on-the-job search
This sequence of actions implies that workers always first try to recommend their contacts
of the same type whether they are unemployed or mismatched and only afterwards forward the
offer to the unemployed contacts of the opposite type. One rationale for this assumption is that
workers with the same training are often working in teams and their knowledge is complementary
to each over. Thus there maybe private productivity gains from recommending workers of the
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same type. Nevertheless, no specific technology assumptions are necessary for the purpose of
this paper. Since unemployed workers of the same type are still prioritized, there is no change
in the expressions for λAA and λBB compared to the model without on-the-job search. Next
suppose the worker doesn’t have any unemployed type A contacts which happens with probability
eγnA . Conditional on being employed, a given contact is working in occupation A with probability
eAA/eA and is mismatched with a counterprobability eAB/eA. Thus with probability (eAA/eA)
γn
all employed contacts are working in occupation A. This means that 1 − (eAA/eA)
γn is the
probability that there is at least one mismatched employee out of γn employed type A contacts.
This reasoning allows me to calculate the job arrival rate ηA in the following way:
ηA =
svA
eAB
· eγnA ·
(
1−
(eAA
eA
)γn)
=
svA
eAB
· (eγnA − e
γn
AA)
Further note that with probability eγnAA = e
γn
A · (eAA/eA)
γn neither of type A contacts of the
incumbent employee is unemployed nor mismatched. However, with probability 1 − e
(1−γ)n
B
there is at least one unemployed type B contact, so the job-finding rate λBA becomes:
λBA =
svA
uB
· eγnAA · (1− e
(1−γ)n
B )
In a similar way, one can derive the job-finding rate λAB and the job arrival rate to mismatched
type B workers associated with on-the-job search ηB:
λAB =
svB
uA
· eγnBB · (1− e
(1−γ)n
A ) and ηB =
svB
eBA
· (eγnB − e
γn
BB)
Differential equations for unemployment don’t change with on-the-job search, thus u˙j = δej −
(λjA+λjB)(1−ej), j = A,B. Next consider changes in variable eAA. The inflow of workers into
this category consists of unemployed type A workers λAAuA and mismatched workers coming
from occupation B, that is ηAeAB. Given that eAB = eA − eAA, uA = 1− eA and repeating the
analysis for type B workers one gets the following steady state conditions for eAA and eBB:
eAA(ηA + δ) = λAA(1− eA) + ηAeA
eBB(ηB + δ) = λBB(1− eB) + ηBeB
Solving these two equations jointly with the steady state equations u˙A = 0 and u˙B = 0 with
respect to variables {eA, eAA, eB, eBB} gives rise to lemma 3:
Lemma 3: For every state i, i = 1, ..,m, the equilibrium rates eA, eAA, eB and eBB are
uniquely determined from the following system of equations:
svA(1− e
γn
A ) + svB · e
γn
BB · (1− e
(1−γ)n
A ) = δeA where δeBB = svB(1− e
γn
BB) (5.4)
svA · e
γn
AA · (1− e
(1−γ)n
B ) + svB · (1− e
γn
B ) = δeB where δeAA = svA(1− e
γn
AA) (5.5)
A higher number of vacancies vj leads to higher employment in both occupations eA and eB,
j = A,B. However, a higher vA raises the fraction of mismatched type B workers, while a
higher vB raises the fraction of mismatched type A workers. For the same state, employment in
both occupations is lower in the model with on-the-job search.
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These findings are illustrated on figure 9. Note that eBB is the point where function eB(eA) is
crossing the horizontal axis, so that eBB = eB(0). This means that eA = eA(eB(0)). Intuitively,
on-the-job search reduces employment of type A workers as their chances of finding jobs in
occupation B are getting worse. In a similar way, eAA is the point where function eA(eB) is
crossing the vertical axis, so that eAA = eA(0). This means that eB = eB(eA(0)), thus the
equilibrium employment of type B workers is also lower with on-the-job search (see the left
panel of figure 9.
eA
eA eAA
eAA
eBBeBB eBeB
eA(eB)
eA(eB)
eB(eA)
eB(eA)
Figure 9: Left panel: equilibrium with OJS. Right panel: positive shock in vacancies vA
Further, consider a higher number of vacancies vA which is illustrated on the right panel
of figure 9. This vacancy shock is associated with an upward shift of the curve eA(eB) and
a downward rotation of the curve eB(eA), thus triggering a rise of employment rates eA and
eB. However, there is no change in the number of type B workers employed in their primary
occupation, that is eBB remains unchanged with on-the-job search. If occupation A has low
labour demand, then relatively many type B workers find jobs in their primary occupation
directly from unemployment and relatively few workers go through the state of intermediate
mismatch employment in occupation A. In contrast, when occupation A is expanding, then
relatively many type B workers go through the state of intermediate employment in occupation
A and relatively few of them find jobs directly from unemployment. However, the sum of the two
inflows (from unemployment and mismatched jobs) remains unchanged whatever the situation
in occupation A, leading to the unchanged rate eBB. Hence, the number of mismatched type B
workers eBA = eB − eBB is unambiguously higher when occupation A is expanding.
5.2 Numerical example with on-the-job search
This section continues the numerical example from section 4 with the same parameter values
but extended to the case of on-the-job search. The equilibrium employment rates in each of the
four macroeconomic states are presented in table 3. First, with on-the-job search unemployment
is higher and employment is lower in every state. This is because unemployed workers of the
opposite type are now less likely to hear about a job as priority is given to unemployed and
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mismatched workers of the same type. Even more striking is that the fraction of mismatched
workers is also lower. For example, in state 1 when both occupations are expanding, mismatched
workers constitute only 2.2% of the total labour force. This is much lower than 19.1% in the
model without on-the-job search. These stock variables can be low for two reasons. Either
because the inflow of mismatched workers is relatively low or because the outflow is too high.
Focusing on type A workers, table 3 reveals that the outflow rate of mismatched type A workers
(ηA = 0.302) is almost three times larger than the inflow rate λAB = 0.104. Thus the stock of
mismatched workers is low mostly due to the high outflow rate. Hence many workers accept
jobs in the mismatch occupation with a fast transition to their primary occupation thereafter.
Expansion in B, vB = 0.05 Recession in B, vB = 0.04
State 1 with prob. pi1 State 2 with prob. pi2
Expansion in A eA = eB = 0.915 eA = 0.896, eB = 0.861
vA = 0.05 eAB = eBA = 0.022 eAB = 0.002, eBA = 0.069
ηA = ηB = 0.302 ηA = 0.242, ηB = 0.047
λAA = λBB = 0.982 λAA = 0.853, λBB = 0.546
λAB = λBA = 0.104 λAB = 0.007, λBA = 0.072
State 3 with prob. pi3 State 4 with prob. pi4
Recession in A eA = 0.861, eB = 0.896 eA = eB = 0.799
vA = 0.04 eAB = 0.069, eBA = 0.002 eAB = eBA = 0.006
ηA = 0.047, ηB = 0.242 ηA = ηB = 0.021
λAA = 0.546, λBB = 0.853 λAA = λBB = 0.393
λAB = 0.072, λBA = 0.007 λAB = λBA = 0.004
Table 3: The model with m = 4 states, δ = 0.1, s = 2, n = 40, γ = 0.5
Further, as follows from table 3 mismatch can still be significant despite on-the-job search in
the asymmetric states 2 and 3. For example, when occupation A is expanding, while occupation
B is in a recession, 6.9% of type B workers are mismatched (eBA = 0.069). This is intuitive as
these workers experience difficulties finding jobs in their primary occupation B and accept jobs
in the mismatch occupation at rate λBA = 0.072. However, the corresponding transition rate
from A to B is relatively low, ηB = 0.047, and 6.9% of type B workers remain mismatched on
average in state 2.
5.3 Present value equations
The only change in the initial present value equations due to on-the-job search concerns equa-
tions for the mismatched present values W iAB and W
i
BA. Consider workers of type A and
macroeconomic state i. Then the present value equation for W iAB becomes:
rW iAB = w0 − δ(W
i
AB − U
i
A) + ηA(W
i
AA −W
i
AB) + φ[pi1(W
1
AB −W
i
AB) + ...
+ pii−1(W
i−1
AB −W
i
AB) + pii+1(W
i+1
AB −W
i
AB) + ...+ pim(W
m
AB −W
i
AB)]
The new term in this equation ηA(W
i
AA −W
i
AB) corresponds to the fact that type A workers
employed in occupation B may change the job at rate ηA. To write this equation in the matrix
form let NA be the m×m matrix containing the job arrival rates η
i
A on the main diagonal. In
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addition, let NB be the corresponding matrix for type B workers:
NA =


η1A · · · 0
...
...
...
0 · · · ηmA

 NB =


η1B · · · 0
...
...
...
0 · · · ηmB


With this notation modified vectors of present values WAB and WBA can be written as:
rWAB = ω0 − δ(WAB − UA) +NA(WAA −WAB) + φ(Π− I)WAB
rWBA = ω0 − δ(WBA − UB) +NB(WBB −WBA) + φ(Π− I)WBA
So modified present values of unemployed workers UA and UB become:
UA = [(r + φ)I − φΠ+ ΛAA(I − δM) + ΛAB(I − δMA(I +NAM))]
−1
× (z + ΛABMAw0 + (ΛAA + ΛABMANA)Mw)
UB = [(r + φ)I − φΠ+ ΛBB(I − δM) + ΛBA(I − δMB(I +NBM))]
−1
× (z + ΛBAMBw0 + (ΛBB + ΛBAMBNB)Mw)
where M = [(r+ δ+ φ)I − φΠ]−1, MA = [(r+ δ+ φ)I − φΠ+NA]
−1 and MB = [(r+ δ+ φ)I −
φΠ+NB]
−1 are the three auxiliary matrices. The proof is presented in appendix V. With these
results I can proceed to the numerical characterization of the labour marker with on-the-job
search in the next section.
5.4 Comparative statics with on-the-job search
This section is dedicated to the numerical analysis of the model with on-the-job search. Figure
10 (right panel) illustrates changes in the unemployment rate for both types of workers. In state
3 there is a recession in occupation A and the unemployment of type A workers is relatively high
(solid green curve). At the same time having less contacts with type B workers (that is higher
γ) raises their unemployment even further. The situation is different for type B workers as their
occupation is expanding in state 3 and their unemployment is relatively low (solid pink curve).
Moreover it is falling with a stronger homophily index γ. With on-the-job search unemployed
workers of the opposite type are ranked behind mismatched workers of the same type, thus
the probability of leaving unemployment is lower with on-the-job search and unemployment is
higher. This change is represented by the solid curves on the right panel of figure 10.
Changes in the unemployment rate reveal that there are two counteracting effects of on-the-
job search on the present value of income. On the one hand, on-the-job search is beneficial as
the option to continue searching in the mismatched state always has a positive value. However,
this effect is based on the assumption of unchanged job-finding rates which is not the case in
the present model. In contrast, unemployment is increasing and the probability of finding a
job for unemployed workers is falling with on-the-job search. This is a negative effect for the
present value of income. The left panel of figure 10 shows that the negative effect is dominating
especially for low values of γ since the fall in unemployment is particularly pronounced for strong
diversification levels. Note that the present value U3A on figure 10 is compared to its counterpart
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without on-the-job search for two different values of the correlation coefficient ρ = −1 and
ρ = 1. In both situations the optimal level of diversification is decreasing (i.e. higher γ∗) with
on-the-job search. For example, γ∗ goes up from 0.625 to 0.725 in the case of perfect negative
correlation (ρ = −1), which means that workers should have 29 social contacts of the same
type and only 11 contacts of the opposite type. Underlying this result is the fact that primary
contacts become more important if the worker wants to leave a mismatch job and come back
to the primary occupation. Thus the cost of diversification is higher and the gain is lower with
on-the-job search. Similar changes can be reported for the intermediate values of the correlation
coefficient which is illustrated on the left panel of figure 11.
Figure 10: Left panel: PV of unemployment U3A with and without on-the-job search for different
values of ρ, q = p = 0.5. Right panel: PV of unemployment u3A with and without on-the-job
search for different values of q = 1 − p, ρ = −1. Common parameters: δ = 0.1, s = 2, n = 40,
z = 0.2, w0 = 0.85, w = 0.9
The right panel of figure 11 illustrates consequences of on-the-job search in a labour market
with asymmetric occupations and perfect negative correlation. Specifically, I consider a vector of
recession probabilities q = 1−p ∈ {0.01, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.99}. As already shown before, raising q
is associated with a sharp decline of the unemployment present value for type A workers (solid
green curves) while reducing q is associated with a sharp rise of U3A (solid pink curves). One can
see that full diversification is never optimal with on-the-job search. Even when q = 0.99, which
means that occupation A suffers from a continuous recession, the optimal level of homophily
is equal to 0.6 rather than 0.5 which was the optimal level of homophily in the model without
on-the-job search. Intuitively, primary contacts become more valuable with on-the-job search as
they are helpful not only during unemployment but also in the state of mismatched employment.
However, the difference between the optimal level of homophily with and without on-the job
search is diminishing with a higher γ. For example, γ∗ is again equal to 0.925 when q = 0.01.
In this situation, on-the-job search doesn’t have any impact on unemployment and so there is
hardly any change in the present value when γ is relatively high.
Next consider changes in the network size n. Based on lemma 3 one can show that the
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Figure 11: Left panel: PV of unemployment U3A with on-the-job search for different values of ρ,
q = p = 0.5. Right panel: PV of unemployment U3A with on-the-job search for different values
of q = 1− p, ρ = −1. Common parameters: s = 2, n = 40, z = 0.2, w0 = 0.85, w = 0.9
proportions of properly matched workers eAA and eBB are strictly increasing in n. However, the
probability that all contacts of the same type are employed (eγnAA and e
γn
BB) is decreasing. This
means that the probability that all contacts of the same type are employed is relatively high
in a small network but it is relatively small in a very large network. Writing it down from the
perspective of type B workers I get:
∂eBB
∂n
= −
γsvBe
γn
BB ln eBB
δ + svBγne
γn−1
BB
> 0
∂eγnBB
∂n
=
δγneγnBB ln eBB
δ + svBγne
γn−1
BB
< 0
Note that eγnBB is sensitive to the job destruction rate δ. If jobs are frequently destroyed, relatively
few workers are properly matched, that is eBB is low and responds strongly to higher n. In
contrast, when jobs are stable, most workers are properly matched, that is eBB is close to 1 and
shows low responsiveness to the network size n. Further consider type A workers. The term
svBe
γn
BB is a probability that type A worker will get a job offer forwarded by one of the employed
type B workers in his/her network. Thus with larger networks type A workers are less likely
to hear about a job in the mismatch occupation B. According to lemma 2 this has a negative
indirect effect on their employment eA:
∂eA
∂n
=
Positive direct effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
−s ln eA[vAγe
γn
A + vB(1− γ)e
γn
BBe
(1−γ)n
A ] +
Negative indirect effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
svB(1− e
(1−γ)n
A ) ·
∂eγnBB
∂n
δ + svAγne
γn−1
A + svBe
γn
BB(1− γ)ne
(1−γ)n−1
A
At the same time, if the network is larger, the probability of finding a job in the primary
occupation is increasing. This is a positive direct effect of the network size. Note that the
positive effect is likely to dominate if the primary occupation of type A workers is expanding,
whereas the mismatch occupation is not (state 2). In this state mismatch employment is less
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relevant in the job search process. In contrast, the indirect negative effect is likely to dominate
if the mismatch occupation B is expanding, whereas the primary occupation is not (state 3).
The situation in state 3 is illustrated on the left panel on figure 12.
If the job destruction δ is low, employment e3A is increasing with a larger network size and
the unemployment u3A is falling (shift from dashed to solid curves). This is because having more
contacts improves chances of getting job offers in the primary occupation. This effect dominates
for the benchmark parameter value δ = 0.1. On the contrary, if δ is large employed type B
workers can choose among a larger group of type B contacts and are less likely to forward the
job offer to type A contacts. Thus employment e3A is falling with a larger network size and the
unemployment rate u3A is increasing.
Figure 12: Left panel: Unemployment in state 3 (u3A and u
3
B) with OJS for different values of δ
and n, γ = 0.5. Right panel: PV of unemployment U3A with on-the-job search for different values
of n, δ = 0.1. Common parameters: s = 2, n = 40, z = 0.2, w0 = 0.85, w = 0.9, q = p = 0.5,
ρ = −1
The right panel of figure 12 shows changes in the optimal diversification level γ∗. Note that
the four present value curves U3A are depicted for type A workers in state 3. One can see that the
optimal homophily level γ∗ falls from 0.8 down to 0.725 as the network size is increasing from
n = 24 to n = 40. This implies a change from about 19 to 29 contacts in the primary occupation
if the network is enlarged from 24 to 40 contacts. Hence in larger networks the present value of
income will be maximized with stronger diversification, whereas in smaller networks a low level of
diversification is optimal. This is intuitive since redistributing one more contact to the mismatch
occupation is costly if the total number of contacts (network size) is small and every contact in
the primary occupation is very valuable. However, it is less costly if the network is large and
there are already many contacts in the primary occupation. Thus the cost of diversification is
large in a small network but it is relatively small in a large network. This explains the fact that
the optimal level of diversification is increasing (lower γ) with the network size. Based on this
reasoning one can conclude that larger networks are more likely to be diversified than smaller
networks.
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6 Conclusions
This paper develops a search model with two risk-neutral worker types, two occupations and
correlated business-cycle fluctuations in labour demand. This model is used to analyze the effect
of social networks on occupational mismatch and workers’ expected income. In the expectation
of low labour demand in the primary occupation, workers’ expected income will be maximized
for some interior value of network homophily. Thus it is optimal for risk-neutral workers to
diversify their social network and keep a fraction of their contacts in the mismatch occupation
even though it is associated with a considerable wage penalty. The reason for diversification is
that the present value of income is a non-linear function of the network composition. Thus, the
optimal level of diversification is obtained at the point where the marginal gain from having one
more contact in the mismatch occupation is equal to the marginal cost from having one contact
less in the primary occupation. This is different from portfolio theory, where expected gain is a
linear function of the investment share and the optimal portfolio composition is always a corner
solution for the risk-neutral investor.
Comparative statics results show that the optimal diversification level is higher with a lower
correlation in labour demand between the two occupations and with a lower unemployment
benefit. On the contrary, a higher probability of expansion in the primary occupation and on-
the-job search are both associated with weaker diversification. In addition, this paper identifies
positive employment spillovers between the two occupations. A positive labour demand shock
in one occupation raises employment in both occupations due to the fact that workers exchange
vacancy information with their contacts of the opposite type. This is the network multiplier
effect. Finally, I show that larger networks are more likely to be diversified than smaller networks,
but unemployment is not necessarily decreasing in the network size.
7 Appendix
Appendix I: Proof of lemma 1
∂λAA
∂eA
=
svA
(1− eA)2
[
−γneγn−1A (1− eA) + 1− e
γn
A
]
=
svA
(1− eA)2
(1− σ(eA)) ≥ 0,
where σ(eA) = e
γn−1
A (γn(1− eA) + eA) ≤ 1
Note that auxilliary function σ(eA) is always smaller than 1 for eA < 1. This is because σ(0) = 0,
σ(1) = 1 and σ′(eA) = (γn−1)e
γn−2
A γn(1−eA) > 0. Therefore, all job-finding rates are increasing
in vA and vB due to the direct effect and the indirect effect through higher employment rates
eA and eB.
Appendix II: Proof of proposition 1:
ΛAjM =


λ1Ajm11 λ
1
Ajm12 · · · λ
1
Ajm1m
λ2Ajm21 λ
2
Ajm22 · · · λ
2
Ajm2m
...
... · · ·
...
λmAjmm1 λ
m
Ajmm2 · · · λ
m
Ajmmm


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ΛAAMω =


wλ1AA
∑m
k=1m1k
wλ2AA
∑m
k=1m2k
...
wλmAA
∑m
k=1mmk

 ΛABMω0 =


w0λ
1
AB
∑m
k=1m1k
w0λ
2
AB
∑m
k=1m2k
...
w0λ
m
AB
∑m
k=1mmk


UA =


gA11 g
A
12 · · · g
A
1m
gA21 g
A
22 · · · g
A
2m
...
... · · ·
...
gAm1 g
A
m2 · · · g
A
mm

×


z + wλ1AA
∑m
k=1m1k + w0λ
1
AB
∑m
k=1m1k
z + wλ2AA
∑m
k=1m2k + w0λ
2
AB
∑m
k=1m2k
...
z + wλmAA
∑m
k=1mmk + w0λ
m
AB
∑m
k=1mmk


=


z
∑m
l=1 g
A
1l + w
∑m
l=1 g
A
1lλ
l
AA
∑m
k=1mlk + w0
∑m
l=1 g
A
1lλ
l
AB
∑m
k=1mlk
z
∑m
l=1 g
A
2l + w
∑m
l=1 g
A
2lλ
l
AA
∑m
k=1mlk + w0
∑m
l=1 g
A
2lλ
l
AB
∑m
k=1mlk
...
z
∑m
l=1 g
A
ml + w
∑m
l=1 g
A
mlλ
l
AA
∑m
k=1mlk + w0
∑m
l=1 g
A
mlλ
l
AB
∑m
k=1mlk


Proof of lemma 2:
WAB =M ×


w0 + δ(z
∑m
l=1 g
A
1l + w
∑m
l=1 g
A
1lλ
l
AA
∑m
k=1mlk + w0
∑m
l=1 g
A
1lλ
l
AB
∑m
k=1mlk)
w0 + δ(z
∑m
l=1 g
A
2l + w
∑m
l=1 g
A
2lλ
l
AA
∑m
k=1mlk + w0
∑m
l=1 g
A
2lλ
l
AB
∑m
k=1mlk)
...
w0 + δ(z
∑m
l=1 g
A
ml + w
∑m
l=1 g
A
mlλ
l
AA
∑m
k=1mlk + w0
∑m
l=1 g
A
mlλ
l
AB
∑m
k=1mlk)


=


w0
m∑
i=1
m1i + δz
m∑
i=1
m1i
m∑
l=1
gAil + δw
m∑
i=1
m1i
m∑
l=1
gAilλ
l
AA
m∑
k=1
mlk + δw0
m∑
i=1
m1i
m∑
l=1
gAilλ
l
AB
m∑
k=1
mlk
w0
m∑
i=1
m2i + δz
m∑
i=1
m2i
m∑
l=1
gAil + δw
m∑
i=1
m2i
m∑
l=1
gAilλ
l
AA
m∑
k=1
mlk + δw0
m∑
i=1
m2i
m∑
l=1
gAilλ
l
AB
m∑
k=1
mlk
...
w0
m∑
i=1
mmi + δz
m∑
i=1
mmi
m∑
l=1
gAil + δw
m∑
i=1
mmi
m∑
l=1
gAilλ
l
AA
m∑
k=1
mlk + δw0
m∑
i=1
mmi
m∑
l=1
gAilλ
l
AB
m∑
k=1
mlk


So the reservation wage wR0 comes from equation U
1
A =W
1
AB:
z
m∑
l=1
gA1l + w
m∑
l=1
gA1lλ
l
AA
m∑
k=1
mlk + w
R
0
m∑
l=1
gA1lλ
l
AB
m∑
k=1
mlk = w
R
0
m∑
i=1
m1i +
+ δz
m∑
i=1
m1i
m∑
l=1
gAil + δw
m∑
i=1
m1i
m∑
l=1
gAilλ
l
AA
m∑
k=1
mlk + δw
R
0
m∑
i=1
m1i
m∑
l=1
gAilλ
l
AB
m∑
k=1
mlk
Appendix III: Derivation of the transition matrix Π.
Let x be the indicator function taking value 1 if occupation A is expanding (with probability
p) and 0 otherwise. Similarly, let y be the indicator function for occupation B, which is expanding
with probability q. Then the means and variances of x and y are given by: E[x] = p, E[y] = q,
V [x] = p(1− p) and V [y] = q(1− q).
Further, let pi1 = P{x = 1, y = 1}, pi2 = P{x = 1, y = 0}, pi3 = P{x = 0, y = 1},
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pi4 = P{x = 0, y = 0}. For example, pi1 is the probability that both occupations are expanding.
Then it holds that pi2 = p−pi1 and pi3 = q−pi1 and pi4 = 1− p− q+pi1. The covariance between
the two variables x and y can then be expressed as:
cov(x, y) = (1− p)(1− q)pi1 + (1− p)(0− q)(p− pi1) + (0− p)(1− q)(q − pi1)
+ (0− p)(0− q)(1− q − p− pi1) = pi1 − pq
So the correlation coefficient ρ can be expressed as:
ρ =
cov(x, y)√
V [x]V [y]
=
pi1 − pq√
p(1− p)q(1− q)
⇒ pi1 = pq + ρ
√
p(1− p)q(1− q)
which gives rise to table 2.
Appendix IV: Proof of proposition 2:
(r + δ + φ)I − φΠ =
(
r + δ + φq −φq
−φ(1− q) r + δ + φ(1− q)
)
M =
1
(r + δ)(r + δ + φ)
(
r + δ + φ(1− q) φq
φ(1− q) r + δ + φq
)
UA =
1
ad− bc
(
a b
c d
)
(ζ + ΛAAMω + ΛABMω0)
a = r +
r(λ3AA + λ
3
AB)
r + δ
+ c b = φq +
(λ2AA + λ
2
AB)
r + δ
δφq
r + δ + φ
c = φ(1− q) +
(λ3AA + λ
3
AB)
r + δ
δφ(1− q)
r + δ + φ
d = r +
r(λ2AA + λ
2
AB)
r + δ
+ b
ad− bc = ad−
(
d− r −
r(λ2AA + λ
2
AB)
r + δ
)(
a− r −
r(λ3AA + λ
3
AB)
r + δ
)
= ad− ad+ d
(
r +
r(λ3AA + λ
3
AB)
r + δ
)
+
(
r +
r(λ2AA + λ
2
AB)
r + δ
)(
a− r −
r(λ3AA + λ
3
AB)
r + δ
)
= d
(
r +
r(λ3AA + λ
3
AB)
r + δ
)
+ c
(
r +
r(λ2AA + λ
2
AB)
r + δ
)
=
r
r + δ
[(c+ d)(r + δ) + c(λ2AA + λ
2
AB) + d(λ
3
AA + λ
3
AB)]
U3A = z
c+ d
(ad− bc)
+
w
r + δ
[cλ2AA + dλ
3
AA]
(ad− bc)
+
w0
r + δ
[cλ2AB + dλ
3
AB]
(ad− bc)
rU3A = z(1− f
3
AA − f
3
AB) + wf
3
AA + w0f
3
AB
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f3Aj =
cλ2Aj + dλ
3
Aj
(r + δ)(c+ d) + cλ2AA + dλ
3
AA + cλ
2
AB + dλ
3
AB
j = A,B
Alternatively, ad− bc can be rewritten as:
ad− bc =
r
r + δ
[(a+ b)(r + δ) + a(λ2AA + λ
2
AB) + b(λ
3
AA + λ
3
AB)]
which allows me to show that:
rU2A = z(1− f
2
AA − f
2
AB) + wf
2
AA + w0f
2
AB
f2Aj =
aλ2Aj + bλ
3
Aj
(r + δ)(a+ b) + aλ2AA + bλ
3
AA + aλ
2
AB + bλ
3
AB
j = A,B
Next consider type B workers:
UB =
1
a′d′ − b′c′
(
a′ b′
c′ d′
)
(ζ + ΛBBMω + ΛBAMω0)
a′ = r +
r(λ3BB + λ
3
BA)
r + δ
+ c′ b′ = φq +
(λ2BB + λ
2
BA)
r + δ
δφq
r + δ + φ
c′ = φ(1− q) +
(λ3BB + λ
3
BA)
r + δ
δφ(1− q)
r + δ + φ
d′ = r +
r(λ2BB + λ
2
BA)
r + δ
+ b′
a′d′ − b′c′ =
(
r +
r(λ3BB + λ
3
BA)
r + δ
+ c′
)(
r +
r(λ2BB + λ
2
BA)
r + δ
+ b′
)
− b′c′
=
(
r +
r(λ3BB + λ
3
BA)
r + δ
+ c′
)(
r +
r(λ2BB + λ
2
BA)
r + δ
)
+
(
r +
r(λ3BB + λ
3
BA)
r + δ
)
b′ + b′c′ − b′c′
= a′
(
r +
r(λ2BB + λ
2
BA)
r + δ
)
+ b′
(
r +
r(λ3BB + λ
3
BA)
r + δ
)
=
r
r + δ
[(a′ + b′)(r + δ) + a′(λ2BB + λ
2
BA) + b
′(λ3BB + λ
3
BA)]
U2B = z
a′ + b′
(a′d′ − b′c′)
+
w
r + δ
[a′λ2BB + b
′λ3BB]
(a′d′ − b′c′)
+
w0
r + δ
[a′λ2BA + b
′λ3BA]
(a′d′ − b′c′)
rU2B = z(1− f
2
BB − f
2
BA) + wf
2
BB + w0f
2
BA
f2Bj =
a′λ2Bj + b
′λ3Bj
(r + δ)(a′ + b′) + a′λ2BB + b
′λ3BB + a
′λ2BA + b
′λ3BA
j = A,B
Alternatively, a′d′ − b′c′ can be rewritten as:
a′d′ − b′c′ =
r
r + δ
[(c′ + d′)(r + δ) + c′(λ2BB + λ
2
BA) + d
′(λ3BB + λ
3
BA)]
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which allows me to show that:
rU3B = z(1− f
3
BB − f
3
BA) + wf
3
BB + w0f
3
BA
f3Bj =
c′λ2Bj + d
′λ3Bj
(r + δ)(c′ + d′) + c′λ2BB + d
′λ3BB + c
′λ2BA + d
′λ3BA
j = A,B
Appendix V Let M = [(r+ δ+φ)I −φΠ]−1 and MA = [(r+ δ+φ)I −φΠ+NA]
−1 be the two
auxilliary matrices, so that:
((r + δ)I − φ(Π− I))WAA = w + δUA ⇒ WAA =M(w + δUA)
((r + δ)I − φ(Π− I) +NA)WAB = ω0 + δUA +NAWAA
Thus the vector of present values WAB can be expressed as:
WAB = MA(ω0 + δUA +NAWAA) =MA(ω0 + δUA +NAM(w + δUA))
= MA(ω0 +NAMw + δ(I +NAM)UA)
Thus I get the following equation for UA:
rUA = ζ + ΛAA[M(w + δUA)− UA]
+ ΛAB[MA(ω0 +NAMw + δ(I +NAM)UA)− UA] + φ(Π− I)UA
[(r + φ)I − φΠ+ ΛAA(I − δM) + ΛAB(I − δMA(I +NAM))]UA
= ζ + ΛABMAω0 + (ΛAA + ΛABMANA)Mw
Inverting the matrix in the square bracket on the left-hand side produces the final equation for
UA. In a similar way one can obtain the equation for UB.
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